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West Virginia Tax Law Hearing and Appeal Procedures*
By
Thomas N. Chambers**
Louis S. Southworth, I[***
There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years over
the need of a fair and equitable system of State taxation. We need
not only a fair system of taxation but also a companion and
equally fair system of corrective justice to assure that a taxpayer
shall pay no more than the law requires. This need for a system
of corrective justice rests upon the constitutional requirement that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.'
Each time our State has adopted a new tax it has generally
provided some kind of disputes procedure. These procedures are
not uniform and in many cases are seriously deficient. We are confronted, today, with a need to revise them and in the process of
revision to decide upon and adopt a system of disputes procedure
which in our collective judgment best serves the needs of the State
and her citizens.
A key question today and a question which is pivotal to any
system provided as a replacement is the extent to which a taxpayer
shall have recourse to the courts to appeal from an assessment of the
Tax Commissioner which he deems unfair and unjust.
Business & Occupation Tax
Disputes Procedure
While the procedural provisions of all of tax statutes deserve
careful consideration, this article is limited to the business & occupation tax dispute procedure. It is probably the most important of our
procedural provisions, not only because most State business tax
* This paper was originally delivered by Thomas N. Chambers at the
22nd Annual West Virginia Tax Institute, Pipestem, West Virginia, September
27, 1971.
** A.B., LL.B. West Virginia University; LL.M. Georgetown University;
member of the law firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston,
West Virginia.
*** A.B. Marshall University; JD. West Virginia University; LL.M. New
York University; member of the law firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell,
Charleston, West Virginia.
I U. S. CONST. amend V and XIV; W. VA. CONST., Art. III, § 10.
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disputes involve this tax, but also because its procedures have, by
and large, been adapted to other taxes.2
a. Historical DeVelopment
The original business & occupation tax contained no pre-assess-

ment administrative procedure, required payment of a disputed tax,
and authorized suit for refund.' In 1925, the statute was amended
to permit the appeal of an assessment to the Board of Public Works
before payment in cases where a return had been filed. If the petition was denied or not permitted by statute, the taxpayer was required to pay the tax and bring suit for refund.4 This statutory
disputes procedure was continued by the Legislature when the law
was extensively rewritten in 1933.
Surprisingly, it was not until 1950 that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals considered the refund provisions of the
business & occupation tax law,' and in Hamill v. Koontz held them
unconstitutional as authorizing a suit against the State.6
2 There are thirteen state administered taxes of general application (excluding property taxes) in Chapter 11 of the West Virginia Code, and seven
of these, in varying degrees, provide dispute procedures modeled upon the
procedures contained in the business & occupation tax article.
3 Acts of the 35th W. Va. Leg. ch. 110, Reg. Sess. (1921).
4 See Acts of the 37th W. Va. Leg. ch. 1, Ex. Sess. (1925).
5
Apparently, prior to 1950, most state tax litigation transpired prior to
payment through injunction suit, and the like, in both the state and federal
courts. See Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 616, 633-634, 97
S.E.2d 275, 286 (1957) for a listing of such state court cases. For examples
of federal cases, see Dravo Contracting Co. v. James, 16 F. Supp. 527
(1936) rev'd., 302 U.S. 134 (1939), on rem. 114 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1940),
and United Artists Corp. v. James, 23 F.Supp. 353 (1938) aII'd. 305 U.S.
410 (1939). Presently, the federal district courts are forbidden by statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1341, to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." For a recent effort to
enjoin a state tax in the federal court, see Paul Cline dba Bear Branch Coal
Co. v. Haden, Civil Action No. 71-177, pending in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Jurisdiction was alleged
on the ground that the gasoline tax statute (W. VA. COD ch. 11, art. 14
(Michie 1966) does not provide for a State court remedy. A temporary
restraining order was denied August 17, 1971.
6 134 W. Va. 439, 59 S.E.2d 879 (1950).
The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held:
,In attempting to authorize a suit against the tax commissioner
to recover any tax improperly collected, the legislature exceeded its
constitutional power and the statute, Chapter 33, Section 8, Acts of
the Legislature, .1933, First Extraordinary Session, Michie's Annotated
Code, 1949, 11-13-8, to the extent that it undertakes to authorize
such suit, is invalid as violative of Article VI, Section 35, of the
Constitution of this State.

Id. at 447, 59 S.E.2d at 884.
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b. The Current Dispute Procedure
In 1955, the Legislature replaced the unconstitutional refund
statute (and administrative appeal to the Board of Public Works)
with our present disputes procedure which provides for the filing
of a petition for reassessment with the Tax Commissioner and for an
informal hearing and decision by him with a right of appeal of the
decision to the Circuit Court-all prior to payment of the tax.' In
Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto,8 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals held that the provision for a prepayment appeal to the
circuit court did not constitute a suit against the state as did the
former refund statute considered in Hamill.9
There was another and perhaps more significant constitutional
issue in the Butler Bldg. Co. case involving the doctrine of separation
of powers. A sharp controversy has recently arisen over the correct
interpretation to be given the supreme court's holding on this issue.
In Butler Bldg. Co., the Judge of the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County held that the appeal provisions of the statute were unconstitutional under the separation of powers provisions of the West
Virginia constitution. His rationale was that in empowering the
circuit court to determine "anew" all questions presented to it upon
appeal from the Tax Commissioner's administrative decision,'" the
Legislature was investing the court with non-judicial powers, i.e.,
powers properly belonging to another branch of government. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
statute merely vested in the circuit court the power to determine
judicial questions. As thus construed, the supreme court said the
separation of powers doctrine was not violated by the appeal
statute. The supreme court has not addressed itself to this issue since.
The issue which has recently arisen is simply this - Does the
statute provide for an informal administrative hearing, with a trial
de novo in the Circuit Court of all judicial questions, or is the ad7
W. VA. CoDE. ch. 11, art. 13, §§ 7b, 8 (Michie 1966); Acts of the 52d
W. Va. Leg. ch. 165 Reg. Sess. (1955).
8 142 W Va. 616, 97 S.E.2d 275 (1957).
9 134 W. Va. 439, 59 S.E.2d 879 (1950). The Supreme Court of Appeals
stated in Butler Bldg. Co., 142 W. Va. at 632, 97 S.E.2d at 286, that the prepayment appeal procedure is "substantially the same as" the declaratory
judgment procedure approved in Douglass v. Koontz, 137 W. Va. 345, 71
S.E.2d0 319 (1952).

' W. VA. CODE

ch.

11, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966) provides that the

Circuit Court "shall hear the appeal and determine anew all questions ... on
appeal...."
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ministrative process a more formal adjudication of the tax dispute
(with attendant consequences of administrative finality) and the
court procedure merely a judicial review of the administrative findings upon the record made in the administrative hearing? A subsidiary issue might be, what is a "judicial" question in a tax dispute?
c. Recent Developments
We believe that it is accurate to say that the State Tax Department, and Kanawha County Circuit Court Judge Frank L. Taylor,
presently take the view that the procedure provides for administrative finality, with judicial review only upon the record made before
the Tax Commissioner. The position held is one only recently taken
by the Tax Department and by Judge Taylor.
From the time of Butler Bldg. Co., until recently, business &
occupation tax disputes were handled in the following manner. Upon
the filing of a petition for reassessment, an informal hearing was
conducted by the Tax Commissioner or by a hearing examiner appointed by him.' In addition to the taxpayer and his representatives,
the hearing was attended by an Assistant Attorney General assigned
to the Tax Division and by representatives of the Business Tax
Division involved and a representative of the auditing staff or
division. The Assistant Attorney General acted as the advocate of
the State in upholding the assessment. Since February, 1970, representatives of the Attorney General's office no longer attend administrative hearings and the role formerly filled by the State's attorney is now filled by tax analysts assigned to the Tax Department.
The hearing was and is conducted much like a conference, and the
witnesses are not sworn. Prior to May, 1971, the proceedings were
not recorded unless special request was made by either party and
this was rarely done. Briefs could be filed by the parties. The administrative decision, generally, was a one page written notice or
letter affirming, modifying or reversing the assessment. The reasons
for the Commissioner's actions were not stated.
Two changes of significance have been made recently in this
administrative procedure. First, the notice of decision has been
expanded to include findings of fact and conclusions of law. Opinions
occasionally exceed thirty or more pages in length. Second, beginning
May 14, 1971, the hearings have been recorded by the use of
11A full-time hearing examiner was first appointed in 1964. Currently,

most hearings are conducted by the examiner.
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microphones and a disk recorder. Normally, the recording is not
transcribed unless an appeal is taken.
From the time of Butler Bldg. Co., and until recently, cases
have been handled in a de novo manner upon appeal to the circuit
court. 2 The assessment was introduced and under the statute constituted "prima facie evidence" of the tax due. Similar use of such
words in federal tax law have been construed to mean that the burden
of proof is placed upon the taxpayer.'" The circuit court would receive evidence by way of stipulated facts, oral testimony and exhibits, or through a combination thereof, following which it would
4
render its decision.'
An indication that this past practice was beginning to change
was found in two opinions by Judge Taylor in which he held as to
penalties that the issue before him upon appeal from the Tax Commissioner's decision imposing penalties was not "reasonable cause"
11Cases may be appealed to the circuit court of the county in which the
activity taxed was engaged, or in which the taxpayer resides, or to the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County. W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 13 § 8 (Michie 1966).
"United States v. Ettelson, 159 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1947); Western
Express v. United States, 141 F. 28 (8th Cir. 1905).
'4 In the following cases it affirmatively appears from an examination of
court files that evidence was received by the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, upon business & occupation tax appeals, under W. VA. CODE ch. 11,
art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966), as follows:
File No.
Style of Case
Nature of Evidence
M-8
I. D. Moore, Inc.
Stipulations and oral
v. Hardesty
testimony
3040
Amherst Barge Co.
Stipulations, exhibits and
v. Battle
oral testimony
3908
Owens Illinois Glass Co.
Stipulations
5246
5461
5656
6297
6301
7005

v. Battle
Associated Universities, Inc.
v. Battle
Baton Coal Co.
v. Battle
United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Battle
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.
v. Battle
Bethlehem Mines Corp.
v. Battle
H. H. Robertson Co.
v. Battle

Stipulations, exhibits and
oral testimony
Exhibits and oral testimony
Stipulations
Stipulations and exhibits
Stipulation, exhibits and
oral testimony
Oral testimony

Indeed, it may reasonably be assumed that evidence was taken in all cases
throughout the state, since the assessment is always offered by the state as
"prima facie evidence" and prior to May 14, 1971, an administrative record
did not exist in the usual case.
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(the ground for waiver expressed in the penalty statute), but merely
whether the Tax Commissioner abused his discretion in failing to
waive the penalties.' 5 In United Fuel Gas Co. the court said that
"[t]he determination of whether there was reasonable cause for failure
to return or remit the taxes is an administrative question, not to be
determined anew."' 6
In Baton Coal Co. Judge Taylor refused to find an abuse of
discretion while in United Fuel Gas Co., he held that the Commissioner did abuse his discretion. In both cases, the court took evidence
on the issue. The supreme court reversed Baton Coal Co. on the
merits; hence, the penalty issue became moot and was not decided.
In United Fuel Gas Co., the court affirmed the nullification of
penalties, but it is difficult to ascertain whether it did so because of
abuse of discretion or because it found ample evidence of "reasonable
cause" as both terms are used in the court's opinion.'
More recently, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County has ordered
several tax appeals remanded to the Tax Commissioner due to the
lack of a record. In one such remand order, the circuit court said:
This Court, after mature consideration, is of the
opinion that it can only hear judicial questions on appeals
from administrative decisions of the tax commissioner and
cannot take new evidence offered either by the State or
the appealing taxpayer on appeal which was not presented
to the tax commissioner for his consideration at the administrative level.'"
By this order, Judge Taylor has reversed some thirteen years of
practice in his court as to the taking of evidence in tax appeals, and
1'5Baton Coal Company v. Battle, Civil Action No. 5467, decided
February 4, 1966, rev'd. 151 W. Va. 519, 153 S.E.2d 522 (1967); United
Fuel Gas Company v. Battle, Civil Action No. 5461, decided January 24,
1967, rev'd. in part and aflirmed in part, 153 W. Va. 222, 167 S.E.2d 890

(1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 116 (1969). It cannot realistically be said that
penalties should stand on any different footing than the assessment of a tax.
The Commissioner has no greater discretion in assessing penalties than he
does in assessing tax. Penalties "shall be collected at the same time and in
the same manner and as a part of the tax." W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 13, § 11
(Michie
1966).
16 United Fuel Gas Company v. Battle, Civil Action No. 5461, decided
January
24, 1967.
'7 United Fuel Gas Company v. Battle, 153 W. Va. 222, 275-76, 167
S.E.2d8 890, 918-20 (1969).
' Security Chemicals, Inc. v. Haden, Civil Action No. 9779, order
entered December 16, 1970. See also Pennzoil United, Inc. v. Haden, Civil
Action No. 10428, order entered June 4, 1971.
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the process begun in Baton Coal Co. and United Fdel Gas Co. of a
judicial review rather than a new trial in the case of penalties has
been extended to embrace the entire scope of a tax appeal. 9 These
decisions by Judge Taylor undoubtedly account for the recently
initiated practice by the Tax Commissioner, of recording tax hearings.
d. Ramifications of the Disputes Procedure as Presently Interpreted
Two questions of utmost importance arise from Judge Taylor's
view of the administrative process and the recent changes in administrative procedure.
1. First, if Judge Taylor is correct, what is the significance of
his rulings in the presentation and handling of tax controversies?
2. Second, "Is he correct?"; is the circuit court hearing limited
to a judicial review upon the administrative record?
(1)

The Significance of Recent Developments

By limiting the judicial process to a review upon the record
made before the Tax Department, Judge Taylor has shifted the
major battleground to the administrative agency. The administrator
becomes the trier of the fact and as the late Chief Justice Hughes
observed, not infrequently "finality as to facts becomes in effect
finality in law."2" It is only prudent, therefore, that tax practitioners
proceed in the handling of future tax disputes before the Tax Department on the premise that Judge Taylor is (or may be) correct.
Drafting the petition for reassessment, which must be done
within thirty days of assessment, becomes very important. It,
rather than the notice of appeal, in effect, becomes the initial pleading
and frames the issues. Normally, the courts upon review will not
consider issues which were not considered below.2"
19It should be noted that in remanding Security Chemicals to the Tax
Department to make up a record Judge Taylor has injected another new

element in the tax appeal procedure, for the statute makes no provision for a
remand. W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966) states that: "The

court shall hear the appeal and determine anew all questions submitted to it
on appeal from the determination of the Tax Commissioner ....The court
shall render its decree thereon and a certified copy of said decree shall be
filed by the clerk of said court with the tax commissioner who shall then
correct the assessment in accordance with said decree."
20 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932).
21 See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946); 3 K. DAvis, An-

mIarsTRATIvW LAW TREATSE § 20.06 (1958).
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The hearings are, as previously noted, conducted differently
than in the past. Although the present statute states that the
hearings are to be informal, the hearings are recorded. Witnesses,
however, are now sworn. The protections provided in the contested
case provisions of the State Administrative Procedures Act are not
applicable to tax hearings.2 2
There are, however, considerations far more significant than
the hearing procedures. While one may invoke, upon due process
grounds, "the rudimentary requirements of fair play,"23 this affords to
taxpayers small solace indeed for, however currently or fairly the
procedure is conducted, we are now confronted with the situation
where the taxpayer's adversary is also the judge.
Taxpayers and tax practitioners are accustomed in federal tax
disputes and, until now, in state tax disputes, to a full judicial de
novo re-examination of tax liability. But, if Judge Taylor is correct,
we are now relegated in state tax cases to a subservient administrative
hearing conducted by an examiner appointed by the Tax Commissioner, with judicial review only upon the administrative record.
In lieu of the statutory direction to the circuit court to "determine anew all questions submitted to it on appeal," the court presumably would apply the judicial criteria normally used in the review
of administrative findings, i.e., to reverse if contrary to law, or if the
administrative finding is clearly erroneous upon the whole record
or if the Commissioner's action was arbitrary or capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion.
A recent law review article criticized prior procedural reform
proposals in California as deficient "because they fail to provide for
a trial de novo before an independent judicial court with original
jurisdiction to umpire conflicts in the tax area between the government
and individual taxpayers."24 The author stated:
CoDE ch. 29A, art. 5, § 5 (Michie 1966).
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1938). For West Virginia
cases holding that "due process" extends to administrative officers and
tribunals, see Smith v. Bd. of Education, -_ W. Va. ___, -_ S.E.2d (Sept. 21, 1971); State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly, 145 W. Va. 70, 112 S.E.2d
641 (1960); State ex rel. Burchett v. Taylor, 150 W. Va. 702, 149 S.E.2d
234 (1966).
24
Kray, California Tax Court: An Approach to Progressive Tax Administration,37 S. CAL. L. Rav. 485, 488 (1967).
22 W. VA.
23 Morgan
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[W]hen controversies are resolved by an appellate division
within the tax agency, this agency arm in effect sits in judgment upon itself and the taxpayer appears before an
authority acting as both judge and prosecutor. Department
employees identify admirably with the governmental institution that shelters them, just as corporate employees become
imbued with the spirit of the corporate enterprise; such
employees of the agency acquire thereby a vested interest
in supporting agency decisions. As a consequence, taxpayers feel their best interests will be served by an easily
accessible, independent appellate body and in establishing
such separate departments, states have acknowledged the
wisdom of this theory and the significance of improved taxpayer morale.2"
Under the existing statute, the hearing examiner is delegated
only the power to "hear." The determination of tax liability is made
by the Tax Commissioner. Under present procedure either the
hearing examiner or tax analyst prepares the proposed administrative
decision and after internal coordination between and among the
hearing examiner, tax analyst, and Business Tax Division, the decision is presented to the Commissioner for signature. The proposed
decision is not served on the taxpayer, and, accordingly, he has no
opportunity to argue his cause directly before the person who actually
decides the case, i.e., the Tax Commissioner.
In Mazza v. Cavicchia, Chief Justice Vanderbilt, of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, held that the failure to serve the hearing
officers' proposed findings on the aggrieved party prior to the administrator's decision was a denial of due process.26 However, this
decision has not generally been followed and seemingly the weight of
authority is that prior service of such proposed findings is not constitutionally required.2"
Legal requisites aside, the role accorded the hearing examiner
in the administrative process in other areas exceeds the role given
him under the West Virginia statute in question. Focusing on this
Id.
15 NJ. 498, 502-03, 105 A.2d 545, 547 (1954).
27
See 2 K. DAvis, ADMINIsATIE LAW TREATISE,
25

26

Gonzales v. United States, 364 U.S. 59 (1960).
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point in 1941, the Report of the Attorney Generars Committee on
Administrative Practice, observed: 2"
In most of the agencies the person who presides is an
adviser with no real power to decide ....

He may simply

be a monitor at the hearing with power to keep order and
supervise the recording of testimony but little or none to
make rulings or to play a real part in the final decision of
the case ....Or he may have substantial power to rule at
the hearing. . . .The Committee. . .has been impressed
with the fact that as the conduct of the hearing becomes
divorced from responsibility for decision two undesirable
consequences ensue. The hearing itself degenerates, and
the decision becomes anonymous.
Let us make it clear that we are not critical of the existing
administrative hearing procedure if that procedure is what we think
it to be - a preliminary informal process, with a de novo judicial
review. But, if administrative finality attaches thereto, as would be
the case under Judge Taylor's views, then we conclude that a subservient hearing process is inadequate.
As an informal procedure, the present Petition for Reassessment procedure fulfills a useful function. After all, the Tax Commissioner goes to the circuit court armed with a statutory declaration
that his assessment is prima facie correct. He ought to do something to earn his presumption.
As Professor Davis observed: "[E]ven where formal proceedings
are fully available, informal procedures constitute the vast bulk of
administrative adjudication
and are truly the lifeblood of the adnistrative process." 29
Thus, if our present tax hearing becomes, in effect, the trial court,
a need will exist for an informal process whereby the bulk of the
controversies can be resolved in a less formal way.
Finally, if the administrative hearing is the place where the
evidence is taken, it would seem highly doubtful that certified public
28

1941

REPORT

OF

mmNIsTRAivE PRAcncE at
29

1 K. DAvis, A

THE ATTORNEY

G.NmRAi's

COMMTBE

ON AD-

46.

nusnATvE LAw TREATIsE,

§ 4.11 (1958).
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accountants or any tax practitioner other than an attorney can
represent clients in such hearings."
(2) New Trial or Judicial Review of Administrative Findings: Is
Judge Taylor Correct?
It is clear beyond argument that the Legislature intended to
grant taxpayers aggrieved by a ruling of the Tax Commissioner the
right to appeal the determination of tax liability to the circuit court
and to receive a new trial in that court. The statutory words are
that "[t]he court shall hear the appeal and determine anew all
questions... ."31
Anew means de novo, over again, afresh or a second time.32
The primary definition of de novo is "anew."33 Thus, when the court
makes a determination anew under the appeal statute, the determination should be made de novo, as if the question had never been
decided by the Tax Commissioner.
The question of statutory meaning is well revealed by comparing the existing hearing and appeal statutes with a proposed
revision thereof, contained in the Committee Substitute for H.B.
30
The "Definition of the Practice of Law" adopted by our State Supreme
Court, effective July 11, 1961, includes the representation of "[tihe interest of
another before ... any executive or administrative tribunal, agency or officer
otherwise than in the presentation of facts, figures or factual conclusions as
distinguished from legal conclusions in respect to such facts and figures."
145 W. Va. at XIV, XVI (1961).
In W. Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959),
the W. Va. Supreme Court of Appeals held that the representation of claimants
at hearings before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and his duly
appointed trial examiners and the preparation of notices of appeal to the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board constituted the practice of law
and that one so engaged may be enjoined if he is not licensed to practice
law. Further, the court held that the Compensation Commissioner could not
under his general rule-making power permit such practice by regulation since
such would be "void as a legislative encroachment upon the inherent power
of the judicial department of the government." Id. at 535, 109 S.E.2d at 439.
If the administrative tax hearing is or becomes the proceeding in which
the evidence is taken then it would appear to be clear that the preparation of
a Petition for Reassessment and the representation of taxpayers at the hearing
constitutes the practice of law, as defined by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals.
31 W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966).
321n re Farlin, 350 E11. App. 328, 112 N.E.2d 736 (1953); Wilson v.
Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Mo. 1963). In re Hayes, 261 N.C. 616, 622,
135 S.E.2d 645, 649 (1964);.Poster v. Carsen School Distr. No. 301, 63
Wash.2d
29, 32, 385 P.2d 367, 369 (1963).
33
WEBSTER'S TaID INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 602 (1963); BLAcz's
LAw DICTIONARY 483 (4th ed. 1951).
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1078, proposed during the 1971 Regular Session of the Legislature.1 4
This change was not adopted, but if Judge Taylor is correct, the same
result will have been reached without legislation.
Returning to the Supreme Court decision in Butler Bldg. Co.,
the argument was made that by empowering the circuit court to
determine anew all questions, the Legislature had conferred upon
the court administrative (non-judicial) power contrary to that part
of the West Virginia Constitution relative to the division of the
powers of government, which declares that "[t]he legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that
neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the
others. .

..",

Citing its duty to give a constitutional construction to a statute
where possible, the court in Butler Bldg. Co. placed a judicial gloss
on the words of the statute. It said that the Legislature intended by
the words "determine anew all questions" to authorize the court to
review and determine only "judicial questions.""6 At no place in its
opinion did the supreme court say that the circuit court may not
determine such questions anew or that it may not receive evidence.
Neither did the supreme court say that the taking of evidence or
fact finding are non-judicial powers. To the contrary, these are functions which courts perform every day.
The supreme court defined "judicial questions" to be questions
such as the "validity of the assessment and the liability of the taxpayer for the tax assessed.

. .

." The court noted that these ques-

tions "follow and result from the preliminary administrative action
of the State Tax Commissioner in assessing and fixing the amount of
the tax," and further stated:
That action by the State Tax Commissioner and his
action upon the petition of the taxpayer for reassessment
3

4 ComM. Substitute for H.B. No. 1078, 1971 W. Va. Leg., Reg. Sess.,
would have amended the administrative hearing provisions, W. VA. CoDE, ch.
11, art. 13, § 7(b) (Michie 1966), to expressly provide that "an appropriate
record shall be made for review upon any appeal." It would have amended
the appeal provision, W. VA. CoDE ch. 11, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1966), to
substitute for the present "determine anew all questions" language a direction
that "the court shall hear the appeal in equity and review all questions."
Neither provision had been contained in the original House bill, were not the
subject of a public hearing, and were later deleted from the bill.
35

36

W. VA. CONST., Art. V,

§ 1.
142 W. Va. at 624, 625, 627, 97 S.E.2d at 281, 282.

rId.at 626, 97 S.E.2d at 282.
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of the tax involve the exercise by the State Tax Commissioner of an administrative function; but these matters are
not expressly or by necessary implication committed to or
vested in the court for determination on appeal ... "
The Tax Commissioner is authorized by statute to "investigate
and determine. . . the tax liability of the taxpayer and make an
assessment therefor." 9 The exercise of his discretion in singling out
a specific taxpayer for investigation or in making an assessment
against him is not the action which is challenged in court. The
validity or correctness of the assessment is the judicial issue, and
the resolution of this issue may properly involve fact finding.
The confusion which has recently arisen over the meaning of
the Butler Bldg. Co., case as to the taking of evidence and fact finding
in the circuit court may be attributed to the fact that in each of the
cases discussed and distinguished in Butler Bldg. Co., which involved
an unconstitutional delegation of non-judicial powers or duties upon
the courts, a trial de novo was also conferred. However, in those
cases it was not the award to the litigants of a trial de novo in the
circuit court which was fatal of itself; rather it was the attempt to
confer or impose upon the court a discretionary legislative or executive function.
The reason for holding that non-judicial functions may not be
reviewed de novo, observes Professor Davis, is not that a court is
lacking in qualifications to make findings of fact from conflicting
evidence, but that a court may be lacking in qualifications to exercise
a function that is deemed non-judicial.4" This clearly is the basis
upon which Judge Haymond distinguished the separation of powers
cases in Butler Bldg. Co. The issue upon appeal of an assessment by
the Tax Commissioner is not the Commissioner's discretion; rather,
it is the correctness of the assessment of tax liability. The ascertainment of facts in a tax controversy brings into question no discretionary action on the part of the taxing authority. It is an indispensible part of the determination of the validity of the assessment
and the liability of the taxpayer to pay it.
Professor Davis indicates that while the scope of judicial review
of administrative action ranges from zero to one hundred per cent,
'3
39

Id. at 625, 97 S.E.2d at 281.
W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 13, § 7 (Miclie 1966).
TREATISE, § 29.10 (1958).

40 4 K. DAVIs, ADMqISTRATrvm LAW
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court review of a federal tax case handled by the Internal Revenue
Service is "[a]n example of something approaching one hundred per
cent substitution of judgment.... 4"1
In the area of federal income, estate and gift taxes a taxpayer
may obtain a de novo judicial review of a tax deficiency in either the
United States Tax Court, the Court of Claims or the United States
District Court, the only difference being that the District Court and
Court of Claims are available only upon prior payment of the tax.
The American Bar Association has recently proposed that even
this distinction be abolished so that federal taxpayers will have a full
and free choice of judicial forums.42
There is nothing inherently non-judicial about the determination
of tax liability. To echo Professor Davis.
If the separation of powers clause prevents the Court
from substituting its judgment for that of the [Tax Commissioner] on fact questions, then the separation of powers
clause of the West Virginia constitution, so interpreted,
violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States, as interpreted by the Federal Supreme
Court, and is therefore unconstitutional!
Conclusion
In the state tax arena, no less than the federal, taxpayers should
have the right to an independent adjudication of tax controversies.
In supporting our present system of providing a new trial in the
circuit court, we do not mean to imply that it would be unconstitutional for the Legislature to adopt an administrative procedure
which limited later court consideration to a judicial review upon
the record made.4"
The issue, when the statute confers upon the court only a
limited power of review, is normally one of whether due process has
been satisfied, rather than whether the separation of powers doctrine
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, § 29.01 FNI (1958).
See 23 THE TAx LAWYER 965 (1970).
43 Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West
Virginia A Study in Separation of Powers,44 W. VA. L.Q., 270, 292 (1938).
-4 See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Anderson National
Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246-47 (1944); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 402 (1938).
41
42
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has been violated, in reverse, i.e., by conferring judicial power upon
the executive or legislative branch of government. Only California
seems to have adopted this line of reasoning."
Thus, we see a need for an enlarged informal administrative
conference procedure, desirably prior to assessment and free of
adjudication overtones.
We would recommend, also, that the hearing and appeal procedures in the various tax articles be made more uniform, possibly
through enactment of a separate disputes procedure article in
chapter 11 of the West Virginia Code. However, the right of a taxpayer feeling aggrieved by an assessment of the Tax Commissioner
to appeal that assessment to the circuit court and there to receive a
new trial upon all matters of tax liability should be preserved.46

K. DAvis, ADmIImSTRATrIVE LAW TREATISE, § 1.09 (1958).
An alternative between a subservient administrative hearing and a
new trial in the circuit court would be to establish a Tax Court or Board of
Tax Appeals within the Executive Department independent of the tax commissioner.
In 1957, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws,
acting upon the suggestion of the American Bar Association, drafted a model
State Tax Court Act. Several states such as Ohio, Wisconsin, Oregon and
the District of Columbia, have established a Tax Court or Board of Tax
Appeals.
The United States Tax Court handles with a single, one week trial
calendar all federal income, estate and gift tax cases brought by West Virginia residents in that forum in. a year. The State Tax Department advises
that while over 100 hearings per year are held in business tax matters only
35 appeals were lodged in the circuit courts of this state in the past 17 months
(7 of these were from inheritance tax 'assessments). Accordingly, it does not
seem that the present volume of cases requires the creation of a West Virginia
Tax Court unless such is the only way that a truly independent determination
of tax liability can be granted.
45 1
46
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